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10.18573/mas.109 The flourishing of rural martial arts groups in modern China 
was largely facilitated by popular beliefs in invulnerability rituals. 
Invulnerability rituals, defined as the ability to defend oneself from 
physical harms through religious rituals, played a significant role 
in uniting martial arts groups during the Boxer Uprising, which 
was well-known for targeting Christian missionaries. Through 
the teachings of cross-regional networks of wandering martial arts 
masters, invulnerability rituals were initially used for defending 
rural communities against bandits. After learning invulnerability 
rituals, people could tame demonic power by summoning the 
presence of martial gods. Those wandering martial arts masters 
were careerist teachers who first promoted the use of protective 
martial arts against bandits and then expanded the use of 
invulnerability rituals in resolving all local disputes such as lineage 
conflicts and competition for natural resources. These martial arts 
groups then became one of the most destabilizing social actors, 
threatening the security of people’s livelihood. Eventually, during 
the early People’s Republic, martial arts groups and invulnerability 
rituals disappeared as a result of the Communist Party’s 
nationwide campaigns against alleged counterrevolutionaries.
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INTRODUCTION
When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came into power in 1949, 
it immediately launched a nationwide campaign against the alleged 
‘counterrevolutionaries’ (fan geming). A significant portion of these 
counterrevolutionaries were leaders and active participants of local 
martial arts groups in rural China. The presence of local martial arts 
groups can be found almost everywhere in Chinese archives and 
gazetteers. Some of these communities and their predecessors were the 
OHDGLQJJURXSVLQSHDVDQWUHEHOOLRQVDQGVRFLDOXQUHVWGXULQJWKH4LQJ
Dynasty (1644-1912). Both the Nationalist Party and the CCP in the 
twentieth century viewed them with suspicion and labeled them as one 
of the most dangerous actors in the governance of rural society.
In this paper I focus on a case study of rural martial arts groups in 
Poyang County of Jiangxi Province in Southern China to understand 
the origin and development of these communities. Poyang County, 
neighboring the Poyang Lake (China’s largest freshwater lake), was a 
trading center of both agricultural and commercial goods in the mid-
Yangtze River region. Its prosperity also led to serious social instability 
because of bandit activities and competition for material interests 
among different local groups. Based on archival sources, I argue that 
the emergence of martial arts groups in rural China was a protective 
survival strategy against endemic bandit threats. When the martial 
arts groups grew stronger, however, they also became a significant 
destabilizing force within local governance.
THE BANDIT PROBLEM
Banditry was one of the most enduring and endemic threats to people’s 
livelihoods in rural China before the Chinese Communist Party came 
to power in 1949. Rural residents were living in an environment that 
suffered constantly from capital and human losses as a consequence of 
bandit raids.
In his influential book, Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of 
Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries, Eric Hobsbawm argues 
that banditry was a form of peasant protest against exploitation 
and oppression. He names this bandit tradition the ‘social banditry’ 
[Hobsbawm 1965: 5]. Hobsbawm has a romanticized view of banditry 
and he believes local society regarded social bandits as non-criminal and 
honorable. By relying on the resources and protection offered by the 
locals, bandits became a crucial channel whereby peasants could fight 
against landlordism and other forms of oppression. In Hobsbawm’s 
extended and refined study on banditry, he defines social bandits as:
peasant outlaws whom the lord and state regarded as criminals, 
but who remain within peasant society, and are considered 
by their people as heroes, as champions, avengers, fighters for 
justice, perhaps even leaders of liberation, and in any case as 
men to be admired, helped and supported.  
[Hobsbawm 2000: 20]
Although Hobsbawm’s theory correctly reminds scholars of the complex 
social power dynamics in rural communities between the powerful 
and the exploited, as well as various forms of peasant struggles against 
oppression, his social bandit theory hardly applies to the Chinese 
context. The relationship between bandits and the society in China was 
rarely as harmonious as Hobsbawm romanticizes. 
In late imperial and modern China, banditry was predominantly a 
product of poverty and social unrest. In his study on disorder and 
crime in Southern China from the mid-eighteenth century to the 
mid-nineteenth century, historian Robert Antony studies the class 
composition and the internal power structure of bandits. Building on 
WKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDWWKHPLG4LQJZLWQHVVHGWKHEUHDNGRZQRIWKH
early social equilibrium that had finally led to the violent confrontation 
between the state and the local society, internal unrest became a 
defining feature of the empire. Bandits, according to Antony, were 
mostly predacious. Contrary to Hobsbawm’s romanticized view of 
social banditry, that their action was a platform against the powerful 
and oppression, Antony notices that bandits were primarily composed 
of the working poor who were in many ways living on the fringes of 
society. He points out that bandits were, by nature, mobile and not tied 
to any specific communities. The two most commonly shared features 
of bandits were poverty and mobility [Antony 2016: 137]. Moreover, 
most were only occasional bandits instead of professional lawbreakers 
[Antony 2016: 140]. People became bandits for survival rather than as a 
protest against any specific classes or power structure.
:LWKWKHIDOORIWKH4LQJ(PSLUHLQDQGWKHVXEVHTXHQWSRZHU
vacuum in China, bandit activities became even more omnipresent and 
ferocious. The Republican Era (1912-1949) witnessed the structural 
transformation of bandit activities, a dramatic increase in the number of 
bandits and even more intense militarization of the society than in the 
late imperial period. The first half of the twentieth century was a period 
of ‘banditization’ [Tiedemann 1982: 400]. After the death of autocrat 
Yuan Shikai in 1916, a unified power structure in China gave way to the 
warlords whose power bases varied fundamentally in size. None of the 
warlords was powerful enough to defeat his rivals, and the power and 
territories controlled by the warlords changed constantly over time. In 
order to maintain and expand the warlords’ territories, China became a 
highly militarized society. 
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As historian Phil Billingsley points out, warlordism led to a vicious 
cycle: on the one hand, joining the army was an attractive career that 
provided people with food and clothing; on the other hand, such 
absorption of the rural labor force further debased the productivity of 
rural society and finally the bankruptcy of peasant economy [Billingsley 
1988: 25]. During the time of constant warfare, when the demand for 
food was unbearable for the rural population, joining the bandits was a 
rational choice for rural people who needed to make a living.
Unable to reach a stable equilibrium among the power of the warlords, 
constant changes in the size of the warlords’ armies also produced a 
large number of deserted soldiers deprived of their military status. 
For survival, many former soldiers had no choice but to become 
bandits [Tai 1985: 25]. In Poyang County, a large number of bandits 
came from the former Sichuan Provincial Army that was stationed 
in Jiangxi Province. After many lost their jobs, they stayed in Jiangxi 
as bandits rather than going back to their homes in Sichuan [PCG12 
1949: Lineage].Their military background helped these soldier bandits, 
and non-soldier bandits in the future, to become equipped with 
modern weaponry. Soldier bandits differed dramatically from the 
traditional bandits before the Republican Era – instead of attacking 
carefully selected targets, they adopted an indiscriminate predatory 
attitude towards their targets, often raiding the entire rural society 
and destroying their targets completely. The brutalization of bandit 
activities made banditry an even more formidable element of everyday 
life in rural China [Tiedemann 1982: 422].
Although a romanticized ‘Robin Hood’ style of social banditry, akin 
to that described by Hobsbawm, did exist in Republican China (such 
as the case of the White Wolf (Bailang)), banditry in most cases was a 
temporary survival strategy [Perry 1983]. Except for the case of soldier 
bandits who became outlaws after losing employment, bandit groups 
were primarily composed of poor peasants, similar to the pattern 
5REHUW$QWRQ\GHVFULEHGLQKLVVWXG\RQWKH4LQJ'\QDVW\3RYHUW\ZDV
undoubtedly a determinant factor behind the prosperity of banditry. 
Billingsley’s case study on Henan Province shows that the fertile 
northern and central counties in Henan were much more immune from 
banditry than the poor southwestern regions in Henan [Billingsley 
1988: 41]. Even within the same county, banditry was more endemic in 
the mountainous regions, swamps, and the less prosperous border areas 
where people took less care than elsewhere [Billingsley 1981: 237-38]. 
In Poyang County, even though the land was fertile and the Poyang 
Lake was agriculturally so productive, bandits remained active in the 
less developed regions, especially the mountainous and bushy areas, 
and near the provincial borders [PCG14 1949: How Bandit Leader Cao 
Mapi Accepted Amnesty]. 
Hundreds of bandit gangs raided the Poyang region regularly during 
the Republican Era. Among them, Cao Mapi was the most notorious 
figure who generated countless myths and memories among the locals. 
From 1939 to 1941, Cao Mapi’s gang raided the Poyang area many 
times, including the most notorious attack on the Town of Fenggang 
in May of 1941 when Cao Mapi sent out more than five hundred 
bandit soldiers. The trophy of this raid was marvelous to the bandits: 
twenty thousand kilograms of cloth, one thousand kilograms of 
jewelry, ten rifles, ten pistols, two horses, more than ten oxen, as well 
as the kidnapping of three housewives and a township official [Jiangxi 
Historical Materials 1993: 9-14]. During China’s bloody first half of 
the twentieth century, soldiers within formal military units could turn 
to banditry for various reasons (as discussed above). A substantial part 
of Cao Mapi’s bandit force came from the military. The military also 
provided the bandits with a number of modern weapons.
The Nationalist Government’s suppression of banditry in Poyang 
proved to be pro forma. Its military forces did occasionally respond to 
banditry problems located near where they were stationed when the 
outlaws became too strong. Yet the fact that bandit gangs frequently 
changed their targets and moved their bases of operation made it 
extremely difficult to wipe them out. In cases in which the Nationalist 
armies could not locate the bandit nests, to avoid being blamed by their 
higher authority, officers often commanded their soldiers to arrest 
innocent peasants and label them as traitors who had cooperated and 
helped to hide bandits. In the eyes of rural residents, the Nationalist 
armies were as bad as bandits. The job of protecting lives and homes fell 
to the rural residents themselves. To do this they established their own 
self-defense martial arts groups.
SELF-DEFENSE AND WANDERING MARTIAL ARTS NETWORKS
Historians came to know rural martial arts groups predominantly 
through the lens of peasant rebellions and social unrest in late imperial 
China. When introducing the history of martial arts groups, the 
Republican-edition Poyang County Gazetteer says that they were 
originally secret religious societies born from the White Lotus in 
WKH4LQJ'\QDVW\>3&*6HFUHW6RFLHWLHV@7KH:KLWH/RWXV
Sect (%DLOLDQMLDR) was initially a lay Buddhist movement led by Monk 
Huiyuan of Lushan in the early fifth century [Zürcher 1972: 219-23]. 
According to religious scholar B. J. Ter Haar, the name ‘White Lotus’ 
was used by non-elites as an autonym for lay Buddhist gatherings before 
the mid-fourteenth century [Ter Haar 1999: 165]. From the sixteenth 
century on, ‘White Lotus’ was more and more frequently used by 
the government and finally became a generic label for all potentially 
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rebellious groups. Ter Haar further points out that by the late Ming 
Dynasty, Christianity, Millenarian teachings, lay Buddhist, and even 
sexual techniques were all labeled ‘White Lotus’ [Ter Haar 1999: 245]. 
But people within such groups never called themselves ‘White Lotus’. 
This label existed only in official propaganda. The alleged White Lotus 
Sects organized some of the most large-scale peasant rebellions in the 
4LQJ'\QDVW\DQGKLVWRULDQVRIWHQSRLQWWRWKHPDVDV\PERORIWKH
4LQJ*RYHUQPHQWѡVIDLOXUHWRFRQWUROORFDOVRFLHW\
Modern martial arts groups differed from the earlier forms of White 
Lotus Sects significantly. They were no longer primarily religious 
associations; instead, they used violence more often for practical 
needs, such as self-defense against banditry, rather than forming a 
millenarian religious perception of the world. There were hundreds of 
different types of martial arts groups, among which the most famous 
were the Big Sword Society (Dadaohui) and the Red Spear Society 
(Hongqianghui) in rural North China. The Big Sword Society was a 
leading martial arts group that participated in the Boxer Uprising at 
the end of the nineteenth century. Well-known for its Armor of the 
Golden Bell (MLQ]KRQJ]KDR), a martial arts technique of invulnerability, 
the Big Sword Society was an influential quasi-military association 
in the Shandong-Jiangsu border region against rebellious forces and 
bandits. The local authorities also tolerated the existence of the Big 
Sword because they helped organize self-defense against bandits. The 
Big Sword Society flourished in the 1890s and was a major local military 
force preceding the Boxer Uprising [Esherick 1988]. Evolved from the 
Big Sword Society, the Red Spear Society was also a martial arts group 
that adopted similar invulnerability rituals. In her classic book Rebels 
and Revolutionaries in North China, 1845-1945, Elizabeth Perry uses the 
Red Spear Society as an exemplary case of a protective strategy adopted 
by the peasants as a form of collective violence against predatory 
threats, among which banditry was a primary concern [Perry 1980]. 
The Red Spear later became the mother model of many similar martial 
arts groups in rural China that adopted different names and slight 
modifications in their rituals [Tai 1985].
In Poyang County, the most widespread and powerful local martial arts 
groups were the Yellow Crane Society (Huanghehui) and the Big Sword 
Society. The Republican-edition Poyang County Gazetteer claims that 
both groups evolved from the Boxer Uprising. The gazetteer suggests 
that both the Yellow Crane and the Big Sword came from the border 
region of Shandong, Henan, and Anhui Provinces [PCG12 1949: 
Secret Societies]. Certainly, both the Yellow Crane and the Big Sword 
groups were well-known for their invulnerability rituals that could 
protect them from being harmed. Such rituals, as we will see, played 
a crucial role in encouraging and organizing the local people against 
bandits. There was even a female martial arts group called the ‘Flower 
Basket Society’ (Hualanhui). The Flower Basket Society also adopted the 
invulnerability technique: the female members carried magical flower 
baskets with them and used them as shields when confronting threats. 
They believed that the basket could protect them from all weapons, 
including modern artillery [PCG12 1949: Secret Societies].
The emergence of the Yellow Crane Society in Poyang was a 
consequence of both bandit threats and cross-regional martial arts 
networks. According to the gazetteer, in 1934, bandits constantly 
raided Poyang County. A traveler from Anhui Province noticed the 
situation and told the people of Poyang that he knew the rituals of 
invulnerability. The local people tried slicing him with a sword, and he 
was not injured at all. After that, a lot of young peasants began to learn 
the technique and established the Yellow Crane Society [PCG12 1949: 
Secret Societies].
During the 1950s, after interviewing a large number of former Yellow 
Crane Society participants during the CCP’s Anti-Bandit Campaigns, 
the Public Security Bureau’s investigatory reports told a more nuanced 
story of the Yellow Crane’s origin in Poyang. In 1934, banditry was 
a severe problem in Poyang. To defend rural communities against 
bandits, a local lineage leader Wang Guowen went to Mount Jiulong 
of Nanjing in Jiangsu Province and invited seven martial arts masters 
to Poyang. Among them was the Grand Master Xiong Xinzhai, who 
was also known as Mr. Xiong Xueshan. Mr. Xiong established the very 
first Yellow Crane assembly hall in Poyang’s District 11 with a banner 
‘Protect Homes against Bandits (EDRMLD\XIHL)’. Mr. Xiong’s assembly hall 
attracted more than one hundred local people to join instantly. Among 
the first group of students was Jin Deshan, who was originally from 
Anhui Province. Jin was chosen as the leader of Mr. Xiong’s disciples. 
In 1936, two of the seven masters died, including the Grand Master 
Xiong Xinzhai. Jin Deshan became the new leader of the Yellow Crane 
in Poyang; assisting him was the Xiong Xinzhai’s nephew known as ‘the 
Lame’. Under the new leadership, the Yellow Crane developed rapidly 
in the entire Poyang County [PPSA Z2-1-87 1953; PPSA Z2-1-134 
1959].
It is noteworthy that the seven masters and the subsequent new leader, 
Jin Deshan, were all non-locals. Little is known about the background 
of the seven masters, but the fact that Wang Guowen invited them 
from a mountain in Nanjing (Nanjing is about 500 km from Poyang) 
indicates that they were well-known among certain groups of people. 
It is probable that the seven masters were full-time martial arts 
specialists. In China, renowned martial arts schools were often affiliated 
with famous mountains, most notably the Shaolin School on Mount 
Songshan in Henan Province and the Wudang School on Mount 
Wudang in Hubei Province. Students went to these famous mountains 
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to learn martial arts techniques. Some of them stayed on the mountain 
teaching new students, while most of them left the mountain and 
became wandering martial arts teachers wherever people needed them. 
In premodern China, many wandering martial arts teachers played 
important roles in organizing uprisings against the government; or, 
they might join the unruly forces such as bandits. Historian Meir 
6KDKDUѡVFDVHVWXG\RIWKH6KDROLQ0RQDVWHU\VKRZVWKDWWKH4LQJ
government was profoundly suspicious of the Shaolin School martial 
arts in Henan Province. Emperors from Yongzheng (1722-35) onward 
all feared that the Shaolin School might become the origin of rebellious 
forces or hide criminals during the government’s crackdown against 
rebellion. They strictly forbade the use of fighting monks from the 
6KDROLQ0RQDVWHU\LQWUDLQLQJ4LQJPLOLWDU\IRUFHV>6KDKDU
95]. The wandering martial arts specialists were also associated with 
the Boxer Uprising in the 1890s. Joseph Esherick’s study on the Boxer 
Uprising shows that the invulnerability rituals were not local practices 
and were brought to southwest Shandong by an outsider, possibly 
a ‘wandering Daoist priest’ [Esherick 1988: 104-5]. It was through 
this group of wandering martial artists that various types of boxing 
techniques and invulnerability rituals reached to a large portion of 
China’s hinterland.
To some poor people, learning and teaching martial arts techniques was 
an alluring career during times of social unrest. Jin Deshan was such a 
person. Born in 1894 to a poor peasant family in Anhui Province, Jin 
spent his childhood doing farm work as an adopted son at his uncle’s 
place. When he was nine, his uncle passed away. Jin’s mother took him 
to his grandfather’s home in rural Jiangsu Province. In 1934, when 
there was a massive drought in Jiangsu, Jin had no choice but to leave 
with another four people heading for Jiangxi Province. On their way to 
Poyang, all the other four died. Once arrived in Poyang, Jin immediately 
joined the Yellow Crane Society and became a full-time martial arts 
teacher [PPSA Z1-2-1058 1951]. It was through the Yellow Crane 
Society that Jin finally settled down and earned his reputation as a 
martial arts specialist.
Jin Deshan and the Lame proved to be charismatic and actionable 
leaders. Each Yellow Crane unit was known as an assembly hall (tang). 
From 1934 to 1949, the Yellow Crane Society spread to seven districts 
in Poyang County with at least twenty-eight assembly halls [PPSA Z2-
1-87 1953]. The highest-ranking leader of the Yellow Crane was called 
the Grand Master (diandao shi). Below him was a Preaching Master 
(chuandao shi). Within each assembly hall, there was one schoolmaster 
(xuezhang) and one vice-schoolmaster (fu xuezhang). These two were 
the highest leaders within each assembly hall, responsible for teaching 
fighting techniques and administrative affairs. Below them were one 
hall master (tangzhang) and one vice-hall master (fu tangzhang). They 
took care of religious worship in the hall and all the logistical issues 
[PPSA Z2-1-134 1959]. The Grand Master usually stayed only for a 
short period teaching the martial arts techniques and the invulnerability 
rituals. Then he would train and appoint new leaders as his replacement 
and leave. In Poyang, the first Grand Master was Xiong Xinzhai from 
Nanjing. After his death in 1936, Jin Deshan became the new Grand 
Master [PPSA Z1-4-234 1953].
The history of the Big Sword Society in the Republican-edition 
Poyang County Gazetteer was almost identical to the Yellow Crane. 
In 1946, bandits under the leadership of Gui Changqing raided the 
Hengyongxiang area in Poyang frequently. Unable to bear the bandit 
threats, local residents went to Anhui Province and invited the Big 
Sword teachers to Poyang [PCG12 1949: Secret Societies]. The CCP’s 
investigatory report in 1953 provides more details about the Big 
Sword Society’s origin. In 1946, to solve the bandit problem of the 
Hengyouxiang area in District 12, a gentry leader Wang Zhenbo from 
the Xigang Village organized a meeting with the surrounding villages. 
They decided to go to the neighboring Zhide County in Anhui Province 
and invited three Big Sword masters. The three masters established 
the very first Big Sword assembly hall (tang) in Xigang Village. They 
claimed that learning the Big Sword techniques would make people 
invulnerable to all the weapons on the battlefield. All the people from 
Xigang joined the Big Sword Society [PPSA Z2-1-93 1953]. The 
notorious bandit leader Cao Mapi was ambushed and killed by the Big 
Sword Society in Zhide County. The incident took place right after the 
three masters from Zhide established the first Big Sword unit in Xigang 
Village [PPSA Z2-1-93 1953]. After that the name of the Big Sword 
Society spread across Poyang County. 
To many people, the Big Sword’s techniques were mythical. Many 
bandits were also afraid to raid the rural communities with the presence 
of the Big Sword Society and called the Big Sword ‘the tiger’ [PCG12 
1949: Secret Societies]. The Big Sword networks developed rapidly. In 
May of 1947, it established units in District 2, District 3, and District 
4. During the second half of the same year, the Big Sword reached to 
District 10, District 11, and District 14.
The associational structure of the Big Sword Society differed slightly 
from the Yellow Crane. Each Big Sword unit was also called an 
assembly hall. There was one hall master (tangzhang) who oversaw all 
the affairs within the unit. Below him was a hall lord (tangzhu) taking 
care of the candles and incense used for religious rituals. The members 
within a Big Sword assembly hall were organized into squads (ban) with 
ten people in each squad. There was one squad commander (banzhang) 
within each squad [PPSA Z2-1-93 1953]. Compared to the Yellow 
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Although invulnerability rituals never represented the mainstream 
martial arts practices in China, they came to be widely known to the 
public as well as the Western world through the practices of the Armor 
of the Golden-Bell (MLQ]KRQJ]KDR) and the Iron-Cloth Shirt (tiebu shan) 
during the Boxer Uprising of 1899-1901. The Boxer Uprising was 
well-known in the West as a violent anti-foreign movement against 
Westerners and Christians in China. The Boxers practiced various 
forms of invulnerability rituals during the uprising. Esherick points out 
that the invulnerability rituals were certainly not a unified martial arts 
school; instead, they were simply popular self-defense techniques in 
Chinese popular culture [Esherick 1988: 53-58]. In tracing the historical 
origin of the invulnerability practice in Chinese martial arts, Shahar 
suggests that they were introduced from Tantric Buddhism in India 
through the concept of the ‘diamond body’ [Shahar 2012].
The Yellow Crane Society required a forty-nine-day learning period for 
the invulnerability rituals. During the forty-nine days, all the students 
had to sit in meditation three times a day. During each meditation 
session, the students needed to light joss sticks, burn yellow papers, 
worship the Bodhisattvas, and chant spells.1  The spells began by listing 
the many deities they worshiped, ranging from the Duke of Zhou 
(Zhougong) to regional deities. One such spell was:
Our gods send peace to us and protect us, 
Iron helmet and iron armor all come from the heaven, 
I shall put on the iron clothes, iron armor, and iron helmet, 
Guns, cannons, and firearms will stay away from me, 
All the nine flood dragons will gather and protect us, 
Guns, cannons, and firearms will stay away from me, 
The Six Ding and Six Jia will gather and support us,
2
  
Swords and axes will stay away from me.
This spell ended with the listing of another group of deities and 
repeating that all the weapons will stay away from us. There were 
various forms of spells for different fighting techniques. When fighting 
in real battles, they must worship the Bodhisattvas first, then put on 
a specific set of headgear, waist belt, bottles (hanging on the waist 
belt), and straw sandals for ritual use. Then they would carry a pair 
of swords in their hands and march forward slowly. When marching 
forward, they would chant ‘we [disciples] truthfully invite the merciful 
1 ‘Worshipping the Bodhisattvas (baifo)’ was a generic term in Chinese popular 
culture for being religious and participating in religious rituals. The ‘Bodhisattvas’ here do 
QRWUHIHUWRDQ\VSHFLˉFGHLWLHV
2 The ‘Six Ding and Six Jia’ are a group of martial gods in Daoism.
Crane, the structure of the Big Sword was more like a fighting unit 
with clearly numbered units. The Yellow Crane, on the contrary, was 
more hierarchical, highlighting the importance of discipleship like a 
traditional martial arts school.
INVULNERABILITY RITUALS
Choosing to join a martial arts group meant responding to the banditry 
problem through violence. But how was violence understood? Ter 
Haar suggests that the belief in demons as the source of persistent 
danger to human beings was a basic notion in the religious culture of 
traditional China. People worshiped different deities when confronting 
various demonic threats, such as the deities of bridges and the deities 
of health. Even bandits often adopted nicknames related to demonic 
forces, believing that such a connection would equip them with the 
power of demons so that they became legitimated as killers. Ter Haar 
further points out that when people understood real-life enemies as of 
demonic origins, they would fight against them not only with physical 
force but also through exorcizing these demonic powers. Such beliefs 
permeated the entire Boxer Uprising and most martial arts groups in 
the Republican era with religious rituals against injury [Ter Haar 2002]. 
Building on Ter Haar’s Chinese ‘demonological paradigm’ [Ter Haar 
2002], historian William Rowe concludes that the existence of this most 
basic and ubiquitous demonic threat ‘made violence into a fundamental 
imperative of human existence […] The gruesome violence threated by 
these demons must be met with an equally determined response bent 
on bloody and complete extermination’ [Rowe 2007: 8]. Supernatural 
responses to demonic power were also popular, such as summoning 
spirit armies against demonic forces, in Daoism and local cults 
[Meulenbeld 2015]. This was also true for both the Yellow Crane and 
the Big Sword in Poyang. Fighting bandits was not only a physical war 
relying on might and weapons but also a demonic war that required 
strict regulation of all the participants’ moral behavior along with 
gaining power from the spiritual realm.
Invulnerability rituals, the magical martial techniques that were 
believed to prevent the approach of weapons or to help human bodies 
withstand physical harms, were considered the most crucial body of 
teaching within both the Yellow Crane and the Big Sword groups. The 
invulnerability rituals were a complex system involving everything 
from chanting spells and practicing spirit possession during the learning 
process to wearing and carrying specific clothes and weapons during 
the battles. Failure to follow these requirements could undermine the 
effectiveness of the rituals and lead to injuries and even death.
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Guanyin Bodhisattva to come protect our bodies from injuries’. The 
schoolmaster would lead in the front with a huge umbrella. Once the 
schoolmaster opened the umbrella (when enemies were approaching), 
all the Yellow Crane members would become invulnerable to weapons 
[PPSA Z2-1-87 1953].
The invulnerability rituals of the Big Sword Society were similar but 
more straightforward in relation to the use of force and weapons. 
The Big Sword’s invulnerability rituals required a learning period 
of ten nights. During these ten nights, the teachers would first teach 
the students how to avoid being hurt by placing heavy stones on the 
students’ bellies, then slicing the students’ bellies and backs with swords. 
Then the teachers would teach them how to use swords. When fighting 
in real battles, everyone would wear a bamboo rain hat, carry big 
swords on their right hands, and chant spells such as:
The Jade Emperor of Heaven and Earth, 
Founder of our martial school, 
Buddha of Seven Spirits, 
Eternal Mother the Guanyin Bodhisattva, 
Eternal Mother of the Lishan Mountain, 
One, Two, Three, Four, Five, Six, Seven, Eight, Nine, Ten.
At that point Big Sword members would become invulnerable to 
injuries during the battle [PPSA Z2-1-93 1953]. People would chant 
different spells under different circumstances. Each set of spells was 
usually associated with a specific technique in fighting, such as the spell 
of Blocking the Spears (Duqiang fa) and Hiding My Body (Yanshen fa). 
To transmit the spells, the teachers would tie a piece of yellow paper 
with the spells on it onto the skin of the students, and then slice the 
students with swords [PPSA Z1-9-8 1958].
Participants in the Yellow Crane and the Big Sword Society did take the 
invulnerability rituals seriously. The leaders of the martial arts groups 
often advertised their teachings only as the technique of invulnerability. 
Becoming invulnerable against the bandits was the primary driving 
force when people decided to join the martial arts schools. For many 
of those who lived under the constant threat of bandits, joining martial 
arts groups was simply about protecting themselves from the harms of 
the bandits through learning invulnerability rituals. Solving the bandit 
problem completely by wiping them out in the region was not their 
concern. 
People also used invulnerability rituals in a practical way to reach 
specific goals in real life. Zheng Laichao, who was a member of the 
Zheng lineage, decided to learn and teach the invulnerability rituals 
of the Yellow Crane Society to his own lineage people because the 
Zheng lineage had serious conflicts with the Xiong lineage. In 1948, 
the Xiong lineage members first invited a Big Sword martial master 
and organized their own Big Sword Society. In April of 1948, during a 
feud (xiedou) between the two lineages, the Xiong lineage Big Sword 
Society killed two people from the Zheng lineage. Zheng Laichao then 
invited a Yellow Crane martial master to teach his lineage the rituals 
of invulnerability. Zheng Laichao also became a vice-schoolmaster. 
More than ten days later, in May, during the following feud between 
the two lineages, the Zheng lineage killed seven people from the Xiong 
lineage. The Zheng lineage were all amazed by the effectiveness of the 
invulnerability rituals of the Yellow Crane. More and more people 
joined the Yellow Crane after that (which will be discussed in the next 
section) [PPSA Z1-9-105 1958].
In another case, Zhang Yintang joined the Big Sword Society because 
he hoped it could bring him good fortune. Zhang was jobless and 
heavily addicted to gambling until he met a Big Sword teacher at his 
grandfather’s home in 1944. Zhang learned the invulnerability rituals 
from the teacher and wished to go to the Sino-Japanese War battlefront 
and fight against the Japanese. ‘If I could master the invulnerability 
rituals and go to the anti-Japanese frontline, becoming a [military] 
commander would be as easy as eating desserts and drinking tea’ [PPSA 
Z3-1-180 1957].
Failure of the invulnerability rituals would definitely undermine the 
credibility of the martial arts groups in people’s minds. In Zheng 
Laichao’s case, four months after the feud in May when the Zheng 
lineage killed seven people of the Xiong lineage, another feud broke out. 
This time, the result of the feud was quite disappointing to the Zheng 
lineage. The schoolmaster Zheng Wenxiang was killed in the battle, 
the rest of his people ran away immediately. After the death of Zheng 
Wenxiang, people were more and more reluctant to join the Yellow 
Crane [PPSA Z1-9-105 1958].
During the Chinese Civil War (1945-49) when the martial arts groups 
in Poyang resisted the CCP’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 1949, 
the failure of the invulnerability rituals led to the rapid disbanding of 
most martial arts groups in Poyang. Cheng Hong, who was a leader 
of the Big Sword Society and participated in a fight against the PLA, 
recalled later that the Big Sword forces were clearly not comparable 
to the PLA’s modern weapons. His people were soon smashed into 
disorder, and all fled away [PPSA Z1-1-105 1950].
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DESTABALIZING LOCAL SOCIETY
Local martial arts groups emerged in Poyang as a protective survival 
strategy against widespread predatory bandit activities. But it is wrong 
to assume that these local groups were necessarily protective against 
outside threats all the time. On the contrary, once these martial arts 
groups gained power in Poyang and became an integral part of people’s 
everyday life, they began engaging in local conflicts through the use of 
violence, coercion, or even predatory strategies. In official archives, the 
intervention of martial arts groups in local violence was often labeled as 
‘xiedou’.
‘Xiedou’, the most commonly used abbreviation of ‘chixie xiangdou’ 
(to seize weapons and fight one another), was a widespread form 
of violence in rural China. In the Western scholarship on China, 
‘xiedou’ is often translated as ‘feud’ or ‘lineage feud’, highlighting such a 
phenomenon as a form of collective violence based on the boundary of 
kinship and bloodline.
Since the late imperial period, rural residents had been equally familiar 
with the enduring and endemic problems of banditry and feuding. 
Although feud seemed to be a natural product of traditional Chinese 
society that was largely built on lineage organizations, it also showed 
the weakness of China’s bureaucratic system which was not able to rule 
WKHORFDOVRFLHW\HIIHFWLYHO\'XULQJWKH4LQJ'\QDVW\DFFRUGLQJWR
historian Harry Lamley, the government considered feuding a form of 
private conflict that differed fundamentally from other types of social 
unrest such as banditry and rebellion [Lamley 1977: 1]. Therefore, 
local officials intentionally avoided intervening in the private sphere 
or reporting the cases to higher authorities. Moreover, lineage leaders 
involved in feuding often bribed the local officials in order to avoid 
turning their conflicts into formal criminal cases. Thus, under such a 
condition of lax management from the government, feuding often led 
to terrible physical and mental consequences for the parties involved 
[Lamley 1990: 36]. Historian Lucien Bianco argues that feuding in the 
first half of the twentieth century showed considerable continuity from 
the late imperial time, including the state’s inability to respond to local 
disputes effectively. What was new in the twentieth century, according 
to Bianco, was only ‘the demographic surge and the resulting increase in 
density’ [Bianco 2001: 180].
Technological advancement gradually introduced modern weapons into 
IHXGLQJ(YHQGXULQJWKH4LQJ'\QDVW\SURIHVVLRQDOPHUFHQDULHVZLWK
firearms were widely hired to participate in feuding [Lamley 1990: 49]. 
Feuding was not necessarily a single round of armed conflicts between 
lineages. In many cases, suspicion and hatred produced in one feud 
often developed into a vicious cycle of revenge between lineages that 
could potentially last for decades or even centuries. ‘Subsequent disputes 
were apt to revive old controversies, rekindle familiar patterns of 
revenge, and thus give rise to new feud cycles’ [Lamley 1977: 7].
In Poyang County, most of the feuding cases resulted from conflicts 
between lineages over material stakes. Among the most dominant 
material causes of feuding were ownership disputes of water properties, 
competition for natural resources, and lineage conflicts. What was 
unconventional but not surprising in the feuding cases in Poyang 
was the active participation of martial arts groups that were initially 
organized to defend the communities against bandits. Local martial 
arts teachers became martial arts careerists who promoted the use of 
violence whenever local conflicts occurred.
During February of 1937, a feud broke out between the Peng lineage 
and the Hong lineage because of ownership disputes over the polder 
land [PPSA Z1-1-53 1950]. Twenty-four people were killed in the 
first feud between the two sides in February [PPSA Z1-4-233 1953]. 
Leaders within the Peng lineage decided to militarize their lineage 
and invited martial arts masters to teach them boxing techniques and 
invulnerability rituals. The Peng lineage invited Jin Deshan, who had 
just become the new grand master of the Yellow Crane Society in 1936, 
to help the Peng lineage build their Yellow Crane Society. Jin Deshan 
set up the first Yellow Crane assembly hall in the Peng lineage and 
trained twenty-six students as the first group of disciples. During the 
following year in 1938, Jin Deshan came again and established two 
more Yellow Crane assembly halls with more than thirty disciples in the 
Peng lineage. In 1939, the second feud caused by the polder land conflict 
broke out between the two lineages. At least one person from the Peng 
lineage was killed. Jin Deshan visited the Peng lineage for the last time 
in 1944 and taught some twenty more students within the two 1938 
assembly halls [PPSA Z1-1-53 1950].
‘Blood debt’ resulting from feuds appeared to be a driving motivation 
for people to join the martial arts groups. Peng Jiamao from the Peng 
lineage joined the Yellow Crane Society as one of the first group of 
students. His father was killed in the first feud between the two lineages. 
Although Peng Jiamao had no formal appointment within the Yellow 
Crane Society, he was one of the most enthusiastic students [PPSA 
Z1-4-233 1953]. Peng Jiawang also joined the Yellow Crane Society 
in 1938 after his father was killed in the first feud. He admitted that 
his motivation was simply hatred and revenge [PPSA Z1-4-234 1953]. 
Although there were only two feuds between the Peng and Hong clans 
in total, several males in the Peng lineage considered joining the Yellow 
Crane Society and protecting the Peng family from other groups as part 
of their lineage culture.
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The adoption of the Yellow Crane Society by the Peng lineage led to a 
contagion effect where many neighboring lineages sought to learn the 
Yellow Crane invulnerability rituals. Peng Guixiang, who joined the 
Yellow Crane Society in 1937 following the first feud between the Peng 
lineage and Hong lineage, was appointed as the schoolmaster of the 
first Peng assembly hall. From 1938 to 1949, Peng Guixiang introduced 
Jin Deshan and the Lame to over eleven nearby villages and lineages. 
Jin and the Lame taught the Yellow Crane invulnerability rituals at 
these communities and helped them establish their own Yellow Crane 
organizations. 
Material incentives played an essential role in Peng Guixiang’s 
‘advertising’ the Yellow Crane techniques. When Jin Deshan and the 
Lame went to one community and taught the Yellow Crane techniques, 
they often received fifty kilograms of grain as an honorarium. Those 
who introduced Jin and the Lame would usually get one-third of the 
payment and share it with the members within their own assembly 
halls [PPSA Z1-1-53 1950]. In another case, Peng Wanggui from 
the Peng lineage joined the Yellow Crane Society in 1938. He fought 
during the second feud between the Peng and Hong lineages. Then, 
in 1948, at the invitation of the Zheng lineage, Peng Wanggui led his 
own Yellow Crane Society in a feud against the Xiong lineage, claiming 
five or six fatalities [PPSA Z1-2-162 1951-53; PPSA Z1-9-105 1958]. 
Although it is unknown whether Peng Wanggui received any material 
compensation from the Zheng lineage, local martials arts groups indeed 
became ‘professional mercenaries’ and dominant actors in feuding 
conflicts between lineages in Poyang County.
In 1948, another lineage conflict broke out between the Zheng 
lineage and the Xiong lineage because of disputes over taxation and 
conscription. The Xiong family immediately invited a few Big Sword 
Society masters to their village and established their own assembly 
halls, killing two Zheng lineage members during a feud. Being outraged, 
the Zheng lineage invited several Yellow Crane martial arts teachers, 
including the Lame, to build their Yellow Crane organizations. During 
the following seven days, seven Yellow Crane teachers taught the 
Zheng lineage people how to create charms, worship deities, practice 
invulnerability rituals, as well as fighting techniques [PPSA Z1-2-162 
1951-53; PPSA Z1-9-105 1958].
During June of 1948, more than eighty Zheng lineage Yellow Crane 
Society members, and over one hundred and fifty non-members, 
marched to the Xiong Village with weapons and shields, firmly 
believing in the effectiveness of the Yellow Crane invulnerability 
rituals that they had just learned. They strictly followed the rituals 
of the Yellow Crane Society and fought bravely against the Xiong 
lineage. The feud began around eight o’clock in the morning and lasted 
for three hours. Seven people from the Xiong lineage alliance were 
killed while the Zheng lineage lost three people in the battle. In 1948, 
there were three instances of large-scale feuds between the two sides, 
but smaller scale conflicts broke out more than ten times. The Zheng 
lineage even used a machine gun during two feuds in September of 1948 
and burnt several houses in the Xiong Village. However, one Zheng 
lineage schoolmaster, Zheng Wenxiang, was killed in the feud during 
September, which terribly discouraged the people’s belief in the Yellow 
Crane Society’s invulnerability rituals. People from the Zheng lineage 
gradually lost interest in the Yellow Crane Society [PPSA Z1-9-105 
1958].
Although both feuding cases above were directly caused by competition 
over material interests, the participation of the Yellow Crane Society 
and the Big Sword Society intensified the level of violence and vitalized 
the enthusiasm of the feuding participants. In these cases, we can see 
a clear network of wandering martial arts teachers that initially began 
their careers resisting bandits but later turned to supporting other 
forms of violent internal conflict. The job of a martial arts teacher, such 
as Jin Deshan and the Lame, was by nature not associated with any 
moral obligation in maintaining peace within the community. Most 
martial arts teachers were careerists who relied on their unique skills 
to make a living and expand their economic interests. Consequently, 
whenever there was a need for professional training in martial arts, 
there was the presence of wandering martial arts teachers.
After the death of the first Yellow Crane grandmaster Xiong Xinzhai in 
1936, the new leaders Jin Deshan and the Lame became more active and 
expansive than their predecessors. Jin Deshan participated in building 
all the Yellow Crane assembly halls in the Peng lineage. The 1945 new 
assembly hall established by Jin Deshan in Sanmiaoqian, for example, 
was also constructed for the purpose of feuding. The Sanmiaoqian and 
Yinjiagou Villages were competing for the grassland that could be used 
for feeding oxen. After an initial feud broke out in 1943, people from 
Sanmiaoqian invited Jin Deshan and established their own Yellow 
Crane Society to fight against the Yinjiagou Village [PPSA Z1-4-347 
1953].
Besides the martial arts groups established by local well-known teachers 
like Jin Deshan and the Lame, other poor people also chose the path 
of becoming martial arts teachers and made a living from it. Such was 
the case of Dong Bakui. Born in 1917, Dong was from a poor peasant 
family. Similar to many poor people in rural China, Dong joined a 
pirate gang in 1940 and robbed several ships on the Poyang Lake in 
the following years. In June of 1946, Dong quit his bandit career and 
joined the Big Sword Society. Five months later, in November, the Jiang 
lineage invited Dong’s Big Sword Society to participate in a feud against 
the Zhang lineage. Dong killed one person from the Zhang lineage in 
the feud. In 1947, Dong spent the whole year as a wandering Big Society 
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teacher in Poyang, teaching martial arts. Dong was also a leading Big 
Sword teacher in the feuds between the Zheng lineage and the Xiong 
lineage in 1948 [PPSA Z1-6-463 1955]. 
Although feuding was nothing new in rural society in China, the 
proliferation of the martial arts groups and invulnerability rituals 
significantly intensified these conflicts and made them a significant 
destabilizing social problem. During the 1950s, when people talked 
about the feuds between the Zheng and Xiong lineages, sometimes they 
referred to it as the feuds between the Yellow Crane Society and the Big 
Sword Society. Feuding lineages and the martial arts groups entered 
symbiotic relations: participants in feuds needed the martial arts groups 
to improve their power, while the martial arts teachers needed feuding 
to promote their careers. Such reciprocal ‘benefits’ turned violence into 
a legitimate channel for accumulating power in rural society. Under a 
society with little state intervention at the local level, it was the use of 
violence through martial arts groups that established the equilibrium 
between competing interest groups.
CONCLUSION
Rural martial groups, well-known for their invulnerability rituals, 
must be understood in the context of social insecurity in China during 
both the late imperial and modern times. Rebellions, regime changes, 
warlordism, and many other social problems had made rural China a 
horrible place during the Republican era. Among these threats, banditry 
was a prevalent issue. In order to protect their homes, local leaders 
invited wandering martial arts teachers from outside to teach them 
invulnerability rituals and organize self-defense groups. The emergence 
of rural martial arts groups was protective in nature. Once settled down, 
however, martial arts teachers and their groups took advantage of the 
existing internal conflicts and became careerists who promoted the use 
of violence in resolving local disputes. Rural martial arts groups were 
both the local protectors and trouble-makers.
When the CCP came into power after 1949, the elimination of 
bandits and existing rural power structures completely destroyed 
the roots which supported the existence of rural martial arts groups. 
Invulnerability rituals and legendary wandering martial arts masters are 
now just myths in martial arts literature.
Rural Wandering Martial Arts Networks and 
Invulnerability Rituals in Modern China 
Yupeng Jiao
MARTIAL  
ARTS STUDIES
50 Fall 2020
Antony, Robert. 2016. Unruly People: Crime, Community, and State in Late 
Imperial China. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
Bianco, Lucien. 2001. Peasants Without the Party: Grass-roots Movements 
in Twentieth-Century China. New York: M. E. Sharpe.
Billingsley, Philip. 1981. ‘Bandits, Bosses and Bare Sticks: Beneath the 
Surface of Local Control in Early Republican China’. Modern China 7.3, 
235-288. 
doi.org/10.1177/009770048100700301
Billingsley, Philip. 1988. Bandits in Republican China. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press.
Esherick, Joseph. 1988. The Origins of the Boxer Uprising. Berkeley: 
University of California Press.
‘Feishou Cao Mapi [Cao Mapi, A Bandit Leader]’, in Jiangxi wenshi 
ziliao [Jiangxi Historical Materials]. Vol. 49. Nanchang: Zhengxie 
Jiangxi sheng weiyuanhui, 1993.
Hobsbawm, Eric. 1965. Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social 
Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries. New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company.
Hobsbawm, Eric. 2000. Bandits. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
Lamley, Harry. 1977. ‘Hsieh-tou: The Pathology of Violence in 
Southeastern China’, Ch’ing-shi wenti, 3 No. 7, November 1977, 1-39.
Lamley, Harry. 1990. ‘Lineage Feuding in Southern Fujian and Eastern 
*XDQJGRQJ8QGHU4LQJ5XOHѡLQ-RQDWKDQ/LSPDQ6WHYDQ+DUUHOO
ed., Violence in China: Essays in Culture and Subculture. Albany: State 
University of New York Press.
Meulenbeld, Mark. 2015. Demonic Warfare: Daoism, Territorial Networks, 
and the History of a Ming Novel. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press.
Perry, Elizabeth. 1980. Rebels and Revolutionaries in North China, 1845-
1945. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Perry, Elizabeth. 1983. ‘Social Banditry Revisited: The Case of Bai Lang, 
a Chinese Brigand’. Modern China 9 (3), 355-382.  
doi.org/10.1177/009770048300900304
Poyang Public Security Archives (PPSA).
Poyang County Gazetteer, vol. 12 (PCG12). 1949. Poyang: Poyang County 
Archives.
Poyang County Gazetteer, vol. 14 (PCG14). 1949. Poyang: Poyang County 
Archives.
Rowe, William. 2007. Crimson Rain: Seven Centuries of Violence in a 
Chinese County. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Shahar, Meir. 2008. The Shaolin Monastery: History, Religion, and the 
Chinese Martial Arts. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press.
Shahar, Meir. 2012. ‘Diamond Body: The Origins of Invulnerability 
in the Chinese Martial Arts’, in Vivienne Lo, ed., Perfect Bodies: Sports 
Medicine and Immortality. London: British Museum.
Tai, Hsuan-Chih, trans., Ronal Suleki, introduction by Elizabeth Perry. 
1985. The Red Spears, 1916-1949. Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, 
The University of Michigan.
Ter Haar, B. J. 2002. ‘China’s Inner Demons: The Political Impact 
of the Demonological Paradigm’, in Chong, Woei Lien, ed., China’s 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution: Master Narratives and Post-Mao 
Counternarratives. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Ter Haar, B. J. 1999. The White Lotus Teachings in Chinese Religious 
History. Leiden: Brill.
Tiedemann, R. G. 1982. ‘The Persistence of Banditry: Incidents in 
Border Districts of the North China Plain’. Modern China 8, 395-433. 
doi.org/10.1177/009770048200800401
Zürcher, Eric. 1972. The Buddhist Conquest of China: The Spread and 
Adaptation of Buddhism in Early Medieval China. Leiden: Brill.
References
Rural Wandering Martial Arts Networks and 
Invulnerability Rituals in Modern China 
Yupeng Jiao
Martial Arts Studies is an imprint of Cardiff University Press, 
an innovative open-access publisher of academic research, 
where ‘open-access’ means free for both readers and writers. 
cardiffuniversitypress.org
Martial Arts Studies is an open access journal, which means that 
all content is available without charge to the user or his/her 
institution. You are allowed to read, download, copy, distribute, 
print, search, or link to the full texts of the articles in this journal 
without asking prior permission from either the publisher or the 
author. 
The journal is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Original copyright remains with the contributing author and 
a citation should be made when the article is quoted, used or 
referred to in another work. 
ABOUT THE JOURNAL
Martial Arts Studies  
Journal design by Hugh Griffiths
C b n d
Journal DOI 
10.18573/ISSN.2057-5696 
Issue DOI 
10.18573/mas.i10 
 
Accepted for publication 30 October 2020
MARTIAL 
ARTS STUDIES
Oleg Benesch  University of York
Stephen Chan  SOAS
Greg Downey  Macquarie University
D.S. Farrer  University of Guam
Adam Frank  University of Central Arkansas
Thomas A. Green  Texas A&M University
T. J. Hinrichs  Cornell University
Leon Hunt  Brunel University London
Felipe P. Jocano Jr  University of the Philippines
Gina Marchetti  Hong Kong University
Meaghan Morris  The University of Sydney
Daniel Mroz  University of Ottawa
Meir Shahar  Tel Aviv University
Dale Spencer  Carleton University
Douglas Wile  Alverno College
To discuss publication or to submit  
a paper please contact: 
martial.arts.studies@gmail.com
mas.cardiffuniversitypress.org 
twitter.com/MAstudies
Paul Bowman 
Benjamin N. Judkins
EDITORS EDITORIAL ADVISORY PANEL
C b n d
